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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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Abstract 
Comparative tests are commonly used during the operational testing phase to 
baseline the system under test (SUT) against the current status quo. Depending on 
the type of SUT, the comparative test may be costly and resource intensive. Thus, 
any insights which may be gleaned about the potential results of the test beforehand 
may provide guidance on (1) the potential benefits of conducting the test and (2) the 
structuring of the test. This paper offers a statistical approach to understanding the 
type of results which may emerge during comparative testing of the SUT. 
Specifically, we utilize the concept of statistical inference to determine the needed 
performance difference between the SUT and the baseline system. If performance 
differences are statistically different, there may be useful information to be gained 
from conducting the test as is. Performance differences, which are not statistically 
different, may indicate that the test should be restructured or postponed. In either 
case, the relevant decision-maker is provided with information about the potential 
results of the test beforehand in order to make an informed decision. We illustrate 
the method of statistical inference on a system which improves situational awareness 
on the battlefield. We define a number of comparative metrics used to evaluate the 
operational effectiveness of the baseline system and the SUT. From the notional 
situational awareness system presented in this paper, we demonstrate the insights 









Comparative tests are used during the operational testing phase to baseline the 
system under test (SUT) against the current status quo. Depending on the type of SUT and 
test complexity, the comparative test may be costly to administer and challenging to repeat. 
Thus, any insights which may be gleaned about the potential results of the test beforehand 
may provide guidance on (1) the potential benefits of conducting the test and (2) the 
structuring of the test. From the relevant decision-maker’s perspective (e.g., Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 
Department of Defense [DoD]), knowledge about the potential outcome of the comparative 
test and implications for test structuring may lead to a more cost-effective test execution, 
providing maximal information about the SUT performance under operational conditions 
given resources expended. 
This paper offers an applied statistical approach to understanding the type of results 
which may emerge during comparative testing of the SUT a priori. Statistical analysis is 
commonly used in the physical and social sciences to understand, quantify, and evaluate 
differences between treatment groups and control groups (Wooldridge, 2003). The statistical 
analysis employed to evaluate differences may range from a numerical or graphical 
description of observed differences using descriptive statistics to a more complex analysis in 
understanding the implications of pattern differences while accounting for randomness using 
inferential statistics. The specific statistical approach employed depends on the type of 
scientific inquiry being conducted and the data available. For this paper, we were concerned 
with understanding the performance difference of the SUT relative to the baseline system 
during the comparative test. In particular, we utilized the concept of statistical inference to 
determine the needed performance difference between the SUT and the baseline system for 
statistical significance. Next, we highlighted the implications of this analysis for test 
structuring. If performance differences are statistically different, useful information may be 
gained from conducting the test as is. Performance differences which are not statistically 
different may indicate that the test should be restructured or postponed. In either case, the 
relevant decision-maker is provided with information about the potential results of the test 
beforehand in order to make an informed decision.  
To present the utilization of statistical inference in understanding the SUT 
performance a priori, this paper is divided into the following sections. The section titled 
Statistical Inference in Operational Testing and Evaluation presents an overview of the 
acquisition process of weapons systems and discusses the use of statistical inference in 
operational testing and evaluation. In the section titled Application of Statistical Inference in 
Guiding Operational Test Expectations, we illustrated the method of statistical inference on 
a system, which improves situational awareness on the battlefield. We defined a number of 
comparative metrics used to evaluate the operational effectiveness of the baseline system 
and the SUT. In the section titled Potential Outcomes and Analysis we delved a bit further 
into the analysis of the potential outcome of the comparative test. From the situational 
awareness system presented in this paper, we demonstrated the insights, which may be 
gleaned and the implications for operational testing using statistical inference. A few 
assumptions were made in evaluating the potential outcome of the comparative test. The 
section titled Sensitivity Analysis tests the robustness of the derived conclusions in the 
Potential Outcomes and Analysis section to changes in these assumptions. The section 
titled Conclusion completes this study. Although information about the actual system in this 
study has been masked, the data and analysis is representative of the actual system, and 
the implications and conclusions of this paper remained consistent with those derived from 
the original study 
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Statistical Inference in Operational Testing and Evaluation 
The acquisition of a weapons system is traditionally divided into five phases with 
each phase having the requisite milestone. An acquisition program is required to meet the 
specific statutory and regulatory requirements dictated by the milestone to proceed to the 
next phase. The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) holds the responsibility for determining 
whether the requirements of the milestone have been meet and the weapons program may 
proceed to the next phase. The phases of the acquisition process are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Overview of Acquisition of Weapon Systems 
Note. Adapted from Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02 (USD[AT&L], 2008). 
The first phase, the Materiel Solution Analysis, provides a preliminary analysis of the 
weapon systems. Within this phase, analysts first assess the user needs. If a need is shown 
to be evident, the analysts conduct an analysis of alternatives to evaluate probable options 
to fulfilling the need. The second phase, Technology Development, involves a determination 
of the technologies needed to operationalize the weapon system as well as the development 
and testing of the technology. Once the technology is shown to be functional in a relevant, 
or in the preferred case, an operational environment, the program may proceed to the third 
phase of the acquisition process. Within the third phase, Engineering and Manufacturing 
Deployment, the various sub-systems are developed, tested, and fully integrated into a 
complete weapon system. Also within this phase, a system demonstration occurs to show 
the military utility of the system as well as the manufacturing resources and processes 
required (Schwartz, 2010). The fourth stage is the Production and Deployment phase. In this 
phase, the weapon system enters Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and an Initial 
Operational Testing and Evaluation (IOT&E) occurs to determine the battle worthiness of the 
system. Congress requires testing of major systems and weapons programs to be 
conducted under operationally realistic conditions to determine the operational suitability of 
the system and whether it should proceed beyond LRIP (Fox, Boito, Graser, & Younossi, 
2004). The final phase, Operations and Support involves a commitment to the full rate 
production and operation of the system. The system is fielded in a real time operational 
environment and maintenance support (among other types of support) provided by the 
relevant contractor(s). 
During IOT&E, comparative evaluations are sometimes conducted. These tests are 
side-by-side comparisons in which the performance of a battalion with the SUT and without 
the SUT will be examined through a series of tactical battles. The intent of the test is to 
determine whether (and by how much) the unit’s performance improves with the SUT. One 
method for assessing whether an improvement has occurred is through the use of statistical 
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inference. This technique, in particular significance testing, is a well-established method for 
determining whether the outcome of a treatment scenario differs significantly from a 
controlled scenario. Generally, statistical inference is used in the analysis of the outcome of 
operational tests and has been noted as a best practice in system evaluation (Commission 
on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education [CBASSE], 1998). While it is not 
suggested that statistical inference is the sole evaluation tool, statistical inference 
possesses a number of advantages primarily among which is its objectivity given the various 
incentives and motivations of the stakeholders in the acquisition process. In addition, 
through statistical inference, it is possible to gain insight beforehand on the outcome of 
comparative tests. 
In prior comparative tests, particularly for ground combat systems, there has been 
mixed success in establishing improved effectiveness of new systems using operational 
performance metrics. In most of these tests, a major contributor to the difficulty in finding a 
statistically significant “difference” between the performances of the unit with the SUT and 
without the SUT has been the sizable magnitude of the variability within the data for the 
metric being considered and the small sample size (CBASSE, 1995). That is, the standard 
deviation within the data has been so large that finding a difference between the means or 
other measures of central tendencies requires a really sizable difference in the means of the 
two data sets—generally larger than can be reasonably expected in combat. 
The phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 2. Ideally, we expect to see what is shown 
on the left. The ideal data would show small performance variability by the SUT and the 
baseline system accompanied by a significant mean performance difference between the 
SUT and the baseline system. What frequently happens in ground combat tests is depicted 
on the right. The actual data commonly reveals large performance variability for both SUT 
and baseline systems as well as marginal differences in their mean performance. 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of Ideal Versus Actual Variability in Metrics 
In the end, the data generally show that any “apparent” difference between the 
performance of the unit with and without the new capability has proven to be not statistically 
“significant.” Upon finding “no difference” in operational performance metrics, alibis are 
offered for the technical results (e.g., unit was not trained, poor scenarios), and the 
assessments resort to subjective measures (e.g., interview comments, commanders 
impressions) to support the case for buying the new system.  
In order to avoid such situations, we propose that it is possible to examine possible 
outcomes of the comparative tests beforehand through the application of statistical 
inference. The outcome of an a priori analysis using statistical inference may point to areas 
where the test may be modified or additional control measures may be introduced to 
increase the likelihood of obtaining desired results or highlighting scenarios in which 
utilization of the SUT may not be appropriate. In the next section, we demonstrate the use of 
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statistical inference on a system designed to improve situational awareness and describe 
how the results may be used to guide expectations on the outcome of the comparative tests. 
Application of Statistical Inference in Guiding Operational Test Expectations 
One of the key insights emerging from Operation Joint Endeavor and Operation 
Desert Storm was the need for a mobile infantry that would rapidly deploy ahead of the 
armed forces. To support this rapid deployment, a number of operational needs statements 
(ONS) from theater called for ground and aerial robotic capability to enable better situation 
awareness and understanding. These systems would improve intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance at the lower unit level through advanced technological capabilities and allow 
speedy intelligence dissemination through enhanced networking capabilities. Over the last 
two decades, a number of systems have been or are being developed to address the issue 
of situational awareness and understanding. Examples of these include the Battlefield 
Combat Identification System (BCIS), a secure question and answer system that was 
intended to perform active identification of friendly targets to minimize fratricide on the 
battlefield, and the Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team systems (nee Future Combat 
System), which were intended to rapidly and securely disseminate information, thereby 
providing a technological advantage over the enemy on the battlefield (DoDIG, 2001; U.S. 
Army, 2011).  
In this paper, we explored the potential benefits of a system under test (SUT), which 
improves the situational awareness on the battlefield by allowing soldiers to detect and 
identify threats (persons or otherwise) from a secure distance and in a reasonable 
timeframe. We comparatively examined the effect of the SUT on unit mission success, 
casualties, and fratricides relative to those units that do not possess the SUT based on data 
collected from a previous Limited User Test 2009 (LUT 09). Specifically, based on the 
means and standard deviations of the selected metrics collected in the LUT 09, we 
evaluated whether the behavior of these means and standard deviations can reasonably be 
expected to generate differences that are statistically significant during any subsequent 
Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E) event.  
Evaluation Metrics 
A listing of the proposed evaluation paradigm for the IOT&E comparison was 
developed and approved by testing offices within the Department of Defense. From this 
listing, we examined select metrics for which data are available from the earlier LUT 09. 
First, we computed the means (or other measures of central tendencies) and the standard 
deviations. Next, assuming those values represented the “treatment” situation (i.e., as the 
SUT was used in the LUT 09, the “treatment” situation is the unit performance with the 
SUT), we examined how different the performance would have to be in the baseline for 
there to be a statistical difference exhibited in the data we have. In all cases, we assumed 
that the standard deviation exhibited in the baseline case is the same as that in the 
treatment situation as no variability data exists for the baseline. However, this assumption is 
tested later in our sensitivity analysis in the Sensitivity Analysis section. (Note: Also, as the 
unit claimed that the systems did not help them, we reexamined the data assuming the 
values obtained in the test represent the “baseline” and observed how much improvement 
the new systems must provide in order to be different.  In most cases, the magnitude of the 
difference is all that matters; thus, whether the data we have is baseline or treatment is a 
moot point except in select cases where the parameters are not symmetric). The measures 
we examined were as follows: 
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 The number of times BLUFOR accomplished the assigned mission. (Note: 
We compared the number of battles, using a “sign test” for paired battles, and 
also the percentage of total battles that the BLUFOR accomplished.) 
 The number of BLUFOR and OPFOR casualties. (Specifically, we looked at 
percentages.) 
 The number of fratricides incidents. (Specifically, we looked at percentages.) 
These three measures assess the top level performance of a unit relative to another 
unit. It is understood that the actual comparison during any subsequent IOT&E will look at 
numerous other measures, including subjective ones. For example, structured interviews 
may be considered complimentary to the statistical analysis and may be performed during 
the comparative test to aid in explaining why statistical differences did or did not occur 
during the test. However, for many of these measures, no data were collected in LUT 09, 
and we felt that the selected measures would give a reasonable indication of what to expect. 
The key discriminators between the SUT battalion and the baseline battalion would 
be (1) the degree of improved situational awareness provided to the unit and (2) the impact 
of having this improved situational awareness. The expectation is that the metrics (or 
measures of merit) will show improved situational awareness attributable to the presence of 
the SUT, and no loss of lethality or force protection when compared to the baseline. The 
metrics are applicable to both the SUT and the baseline battalion and serve as the basis for 
comparison between them. 
Definition of Metrics 
Mission Success 
Mission success is a complex measure driven by a number of factors, among which 
are the number of BLUFOR kills, the number of civilian kills, whether the unit achieved its 
objective, etc. For our analysis, we relied on expert determination by subject-matter experts 
(SMEs) on site during the test for identifying whether a mission was accomplished. We used 
two metrics to assess mission success. The first metric was the number of times the 
BLUFOR unit accomplished its missions. Using this metric, we performed a sign test to 
compare the baseline unit and the SUT unit. The second metric was the mission success 
rate. This metric normalizes the number of accomplished missions by the number of 
missions conducted. It is a bit more informative than simply the number of accomplished 
missions as it indicates the past success rate of the BLUFOR unit in accomplishing its 
missions. The mission success rate is calculated as follows: 
ConductedMissionsofNumber
edAccomplishMissionsofNumberRateSuccessMission =
  (1) 
For this metric, we used a two proportion z-test in the comparative analysis. 
Casualties 
In this study, we defined casualties as the number of kills a unit sustains. Initially, we 
considered two metrics to assess casualties sustained by the units. These were the number 
of losses and the casualty rate. The number of losses is the total number of casualties a unit 
incurs over the mission. While this metric gives a first order glimpse of the force protection 
capability of the unit, it does not account for the cost of these casualties to the unit. For 
example, a casualty loss of 20 soldiers is more costly to a unit that has a starting strength of 
30 than it is to a unit that has a starting strength of 130. For this reason, we decided to look 
at the casualty rate. The casualty rate incorporates information about the cost of casualties 
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to the unit by normalizing the number of casualties a unit sustains by the unit starting 
strength. The formula for the casualty rate is shown below. 
UnitofStrengthStarting
UnitbySustainedLossesofNumberRateCasualtyUnit =
  (2) 
Using the previous example, a unit with a starting strength of 30 which has 20 
casualties will have a high casualty rate of 0.66, while a unit with a starting strength of 130 
will have a low casualty rate of 0.15. In this analysis we used the casualty rate and the 
student t-test to draw conclusions on what to expect in the IOT&E. 
Fratricides 
 A number of definitions exist for fratricides. Among these are (1) any engagement in 
which a friend fires at a friend, whether damage is done or not and 2) casualties caused by 
friendly fire. For the purpose of this analysis we used the second definition, casualties 
caused by friendly fire, as this definition more accurately reflects the damage caused. It is 
important to note, however, that the first definition is equally as relevant as the second 
definition in assessing how well the soldier is able to distinguish a threat from a friendly. In a 
similar vein to casualties, we considered two metrics, the number of fratricides and the 




  (3) 
For similar reasons discussed previously, we selected the fratricide rate as the 
comparison metric. This metric is insightful as it indicates the likelihood that a solider is killed 
by another soldier in the same unit. Alternatively, this metric may be viewed as a measure of 
the self-inflicted casualties in a unit. Using a student t-test, we sought to determine whether 
it is possible to draw statistical conclusions about the ability of the SUT to reduce fratricides 
relative to the baseline systems through improved situational awareness. 
Potential Outcomes and Analysis 
Mission Success 
There were 13 missions in the SUT LUT 09: Three were attack missions, two were 
defend missions, three were cordon and search missions, four were raid missions, and the 
remaining one was a stability ops mission. The BLUFOR had an 85% success rate, 
accomplishing 11 of the 13 missions, partially accomplishing one, and failing to accomplish 
one. A summary of these mission success statistics is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Description of Mission Outcomes 











1 Raid yes 130 10 50 26 
2 Raid yes 130 7 50 25 
3 Defend yes 130 25 50 0 
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4 Attack yes 130 15 50 10 
5 Attack yes 130 25 50 8 
6 Cordon and Search yes 130 8 50 7 
7 Defend yes 130 16 50 15 
8 Cordon and Search yes 130 12 50 6 
9 Raid partially 130 7 50 3 
10 Cordon and Search yes 130 20 50 8 
11 Attack no 130 14 50 10 
12 Stability Operations yes 130 2 50 5 
13 Raid yes 130 10 50 22 
An initial glance at the high mission success rate might imply that the SUT 
contributed positively to situational awareness and thus operational performance. However, 
caution is advised against prematurely drawing this conclusion from the data. Table 1 
indicates that on average the BLUFOR starting strength was about two to three times that of 
the OPFOR. This difference in starting strength may give the BLUFOR a significant 
advantage. Without properly accounting for this advantage, it is possible to incorrectly 
conclude that the performance of the BLUFOR is attributed to the SUT. 
Missions Accomplished 
To evaluate the possibility of determining whether the high mission success rate may 
be attributed to SUT, we conducted statistical analyses on the LUT 09 data. In particular, we 
examined how many missions the baseline unit would have to lose, given the 85% mission 
success rate (or 11 missions accomplished) of SUT unit, to be significantly different 
statistically. The first metric examined was the number of missions accomplished. For the 
analysis of missions accomplished, we use the binomial sign test (Sheskin, 2004). 
The binomial sign test compares differences in the performance of baseline systems 
relative to the SUT system using paired tests. The test statistic only considers the mission 
outcomes, which differ between the system under test and the baseline systems as these 
differing outcomes act as discriminators between the two tests. These possible outcomes 
are shown in Table 2. Only 12 missions were evaluated, as the partially successful mission 
was eliminated from the dataset. The variables in the table were defined as follows: 
XWW - number of missions accomplished by both the baseline and the SUT units 
XWL - number of missions accomplished by the SUT unit, but not the baseline unit   
XLW - number of missions accomplished by the baseline unit, but not the SUT unit   
XLL - the number of missions not accomplished by both the baseline and the SUT 
unit 
Table 2. Notional Representation of Mission Outcomes 
 Baseline 
 W L 
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W XWW XWL 11 
L XLW XLL 1 
 XWW + XLW XWL+ XLL 12 
 
For the binomial sign test, the number of trials was defined as XLW + XWL, or the total 
number of missions in which the outcome differs between the two groups. The number of 
successes was defined as XWL, or the number of times the SUT unit outperforms the 
baseline unit. The null hypothesis assumed that there is no difference between the mission 
performance of the SUT unit and the baseline unit. Therefore, a success and a non-success 
are equally likely to occur, leading to the null hypothesis being defined as:  
H∅: p = 0.5      (4) 
where p is the likelihood of success.  As the objective of the comparative test during 
any subsequent IOT&E is to determine whether the SUT positively contributes to situational 
awareness, our alternative hypothesis was one directional and given by: 
Ha: p > 0.5      (5) 
The test was performed with a 90% confidence level. Next, we used the cumulative 
binomial probability distribution function to determine the likelihood that the SUT unit 
outperforms the baseline unit a certain number of times or greater (e.g., eight or more 
times). If this probability was less than 1.0=α , we rejected the null hypothesis and 
concluded that there is statistical evidence the SUT unit outperforms the baseline unit and 
enhances situational awareness. For this study, we were concerned with the number of 
losses by the baseline unit for statistical significance. Table 3 shows the results of the 
analysis where the probability columns indicate the likelihood that the SUT unit outperforms 
the baseline unit by at least a certain number of missions (e.g., eight or more), and the 
required baseline losses columns indicate the actual losses required to observe the SUT 
unit outperform the baseline unit by a certain number of missions.
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0 1.000 0 1.000 1 
1 0.750 1 0.500 2 
2 0.500 2 0.250 3 
3 0.313 3 0.125 4 
4 0.188 4 0.063 5 
5 0.109 5 0.031 6 
6 0.062 6 0.016 7 
7 0.035 7 0.008 8 
8 0.020 8 0.004 9 
9 0.011 9 0.002 10 
10 0.006 10 0.001 11 
11 0.003 11 0.000 12 
 
There are a couple of facts to note about this table. First, as the SUT unit failed to 
accomplished only one mission, there are only two possible values for XLW. This greatly 
reduced our analysis.  However, a single loss meant that there were 12 possible values for 
XWL, all of which are laid out in the table. As expected, the probability of achieving a certain 
number of successes or greater decreased as XWL increased. For example, assuming the 
baseline unit outperforms the SUT unit in one mission (i.e., XLW = 1), the probability of the 
SUT unit outperforming the baseline unit six or more times is 0.062, while 11 or more times 
is 0.003.  The table also indicates that the required minimum number of losses by the 
baseline unit for statistical significance is six, or around half of the 12 missions. Five losses 
or lower will lead to statistically inconclusive results. In the case where the baseline never 
outperforms the SUT unit (i.e., XLW = 0), the minimal number of losses to show a statistically 
significant difference between the two units is five. Four or more losses will lead to 
statistically inconclusive results. 
In summary, based on the LUT 09 results in which the BLUFOR won 11 of the 13 
battles, a baseline unit would have to underperform the SUT unit by five or more missions to 
be considered statistically different from the observed outcome of the SUT unit. 
Mission Success Rate 
The second metric of mission success considered was the mission success rate. We 
used a one-tail two-proportion z-test to determine the required reduced level of baseline unit 
performance to produce a statistically significant difference. The following formula was 
applied (Ott & Longnecker, 2010): 
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     (6) 
where 1pˆ  is the success rate of  the SUT unit and 2pˆ is the success rate of the baseline unit 
and 1n  and 2n  is the number of missions conducted by the SUT and the baseline unit, 
respectively. Using a z-value of 1.28 and a mean SUT mission success rate of 0.85 (or 
85%), we solved for the baseline mean mission success rate given the number of baseline 
missions conducted. Figure 3 shows the missions success rate and the number of missions 
conducted. The mean mission success rate depicted in the figure is the maximum rate the 
baseline unit can achieve. Beyond this maximum rate, the results of the comparative 
evaluation become statistically inconclusive. The red dot is the mission success rate of the 
































Figure 3. Maximum Required Mean Baseline Mission Success Rate 
The figure shows that for a large number of baseline missions conducted, for 
example 20 missions, the required mean mission success rate for statistical difference is 
approximately 66%. As the number of missions decreases to 13 or that were conducted in 
the LUT 09, the required mission success rate is 63%. Further decreases in the number of 
missions conducted result in success rates below 60% (i.e., there is not a great deal of 
confidence that the baseline unit will accomplish the mission). 
Figure 4 breaks down the mission success rate by showing the number of the 
required mission losses given the number of missions conducted. If 13 missions are 
conducted, the required number of baseline losses for statistical significance is five. It is 
interesting to note, that this closely mirrors the results obtained from using the binomial sign 
test. That is, whether considering the sign test (number of missions accomplished) or 
mission success rate, in order for there to be a significant difference between a baseline and 
SUT unit, the baseline unit needs to lose four to five more missions than the SUT unit based 
on the LUT 09 data. 
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Figure 1. Minimum Number of Baseline Mission Losses 
For both metrics of mission success considered, the statistics indicated that the 
baseline unit will need to perform very poorly to produce conclusive results. However, as 
currently constructed, the overwhelming starting strength of the BLUFOR argues against 
such an outcome. The BLUFOR starting strength to the OPFOR starting strength ratio is on 
average greater than 2:1. This provides the BLUFOR with a significant advantage, which 
may be leveraged to overwhelm the OPFOR during various operations with or without the 
SUT. Given the current test set-up of a substantial BLUFOR manpower advantage relative 
to the OPFOR manpower, it is unlikely that these metrics will produce any conclusive results 
about the contribution of the SUT to mission success by enhancing situational awareness 
and understanding in a comparative evaluation.  
Mission Casualties 
One of the metrics used to judge whether the SUT provides better situational 
awareness was a decline in BLUFOR casualties during tactical battles. Figure 5 shows 
casualty data per mission for LUT 09. 
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Figure 5. Number of Casualties per Mission 
There was a high number of BLUFOR casualties in almost every operation, with the 
greatest number of casualties occurring primarily in attack and defend missions. For the 
OPFOR, high losses were incurred primarily during raids with Mission 1 being the most 
devastating. Although not shown on this figure, it is interesting to note that despite the 
potential increase in situational awareness offered by the SUT system, all civilian casualties 
were caused by the BLUFOR. 
 In order to assess whether there was a plausible likelihood of drawing statistical 
conclusions about the difference in casualties sustained by the SUT unit and those 
sustained by the baseline unit, we used the casualty rate. This metric was defined 
previously as the following: 
UnitofStrengthStarting
UnitbySustainedLossesofNumberRateCasualtyUnit =
  (7) 
Next we used a one-directional student t-test at the 90% confidence level to 
determine the minimum required mean casualty rate of the baseline unit to generate a 


















    (8) 
where 1X  is the mean casualty rate of  the SUT unit and 2X is the mean casualty 
rate of the baseline unit,  221 −+ nn  is the degrees of freedom and 1S  and 2S are the 
standard deviations for the respective units. We solved for the baseline casualty rate given 
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an average SUT unit casualty rate of 10.1% and the number of baseline missions 
conducted. Figure 6 displays the results. The mission success rate depicted in the figure is 
the minimum casualty rate the baseline unit can achieve for significance. Lower than this 
rate, the results of the comparative evaluation become inconclusive. The red dot is the 




































Figure 6. Minimum Required Mean BLUFOR Casualty Rate 
The figure shows that for a large number of baseline missions conducted, for 
example 20 missions, the minimum required casualty rate for statistical difference is 12.6%. 
As the number of missions decreases to 13 or that were conducted in the LUT 09, the 
minimum required casualty rate is 12.9%. Further decreases in the number of missions 
conducted results in higher required casualty rates for the baseline BLUFOR.  
We conducted a similar analysis for the OPFOR, the results of which are shown in 
Figure 7. For the OPFOR, the two units being compared are the OPFOR unit against an 
SUT unit, and the OPFOR unit against a baseline unit. In contrast to the BLUFOR, the mean 
casualty rate shown in Figure 7 is the maximum casualty rate sustained by the OPFOR for a 
given number of missions. The red dot is the mean casualty rate of the OPFOR unit against 
the SUT unit and has a value of 22.3%. 
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Figure 7. Maximum Required Mean OPFOR Casualty Rate 
The results indicate that a maximum casualty rate of 14.5% is required if the IOT&E 
conducts 20 or more baseline missions. Conducting approximately 13 baseline missions will 
necessitate a maximum casualty rate of 13.7% for a statistical difference. As the number of 
missions decreases below 13, the maximum required casualty rate falls to low values of 
12.0% or below. That is, for a starting strength of about 60, the OPFOR unit will only lose 
about seven soldiers.  
In order to determine whether the required mean OPFOR and BLUFOR casualty 
rates are reasonable values, we compared these values to rates generally observed from 
tactical battles in operational tests. We selected an average casualty rate of approximately 
10% as our guideline based on discussions with analysts from the Institute of Defense 
Analyses. The value of 10% was in the range of that exhibited by the SUT unit during the 
LUT 09. Using the 10% guideline, we surmised that achieving a required mean BLUFOR 
casualty rate of 12.9% may be possible during IOT&E. In the case of the OPFOR, traditional 
casualty rates have been on the order of 25% in recent operational tests. Therefore, 
achieving a casualty rate of below 16% may prove quite challenging during IOT&E. While 
there is a possibility of obtaining significant results for the BLUFOR casualty data, the low 
OPFOR casualty rate required makes it unlikely that the current test set-up will yield 
statistically conclusive results in the case of the OPFOR. In other words, it is possible to 
observe the SUT contribute to a reduction in BLUFOR casualty during IOT&E but highly 
unlikely to observe a contribution to BLUFOR lethality.  
Mission Fratricides 
One of the expected effects of better situational awareness is reduced BLUFOR 
fratricide. Figure 8 shows the number of fratricide incidents per mission for the LUT 09. 
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Figure 8. Number of Fratricide Incidents per Mission 
In Missions 2, 8, 10, and 11, the BLUFOR sustained a large number of fratricides 
relative to the other missions. These missions were diverse in type with Mission 2 being a 
raid, Missions 8 and 10 being cordon and search missions, and Mission 11 being an attack 
mission. As such, no initial conclusions may be drawn about the tendency of certain 
missions to produce BLUFOR fratricides. The OPFOR sustained high fratricide losses in 
three missions, two of which were raid missions. 
In this analysis, we were concerned primarily with BLUFOR fratricides. As OPFOR 
does not possess the SUT, OPFOR will not have enhanced situational awareness. It is 
expected the SUT will have no effect on the OPFOR fratricides. We used the fratricide rate 
to determine the limits for statistical significance. As stated previously, the fratricide rate is 
defined as the following: 
CasualtiesUnitofNumber
sFratricideUnitofNumberRateFratricideUnit =
   (9) 
Similar to the casualty rate, we implemented a one-directional student t-test at the 
90% confidence level to determine the minimum required fratricide rate of the baseline unit 
to generate a statistical difference. We solved for the baseline fratricide rate given an 
average SUT fratricide rate of 14.6% and the number of baseline missions conducted. 
Figure 9 displays the results. The fratricide rate depicted in the figure is the permissible 
minimum rate the baseline unit can achieve. Beyond this rate, the results of the comparative 
evaluation become inconclusive. The red dot is the mean fratricide rate of the SUT unit. 
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Figure 9. Minimum Required BLUFOR Fratricide Rate 
The analysis suggests that for an extremely low number of missions completed (e.g., 
eight or below), the minimum required fratricide rate surpasses 26.0%. This high rate implies 
that approximately a quarter of all casualties sustained by the BLUFOR would need to be 
self inflicted. As the number of missions conducted approaches 13 or that were conducted in 
the LUT 09, the required fratricide rate falls below 26.0% to approximately 25.0%. 
Conducting additional missions will only have a marginal effect on the minimum required 
fratricide rate as, at 21 missions conducted, the rate falls to 23.4%.  
In order to gain an idea of whether these required fratricide rates are reasonable, we 
first needed some idea of the average fratricide rate in actual tactical operations. Precise 
fratricide data is relatively difficult to obtain. However, available reports placed the fratricide 
rates around 13% (Bower, Lacey, & McCarthy, 2003; Gadsden & Outteridge, 2006). Using 
this figure as a guideline we determined the plausibility of drawing any statistical conclusions 
from the comparative tests. The minimum mean required fratricide rate shown in Figure 9 is 
almost 100% higher than that experienced during actual tactical operational conditions. 
Given this high required BLUFOR fratricide rate, it is unlikely that the current test set-up will 
yield statistically conclusive results. 
One additional point is worth noting regarding fratricides. First, the exponential-like 
nature of the slope in Figure 9 suggests there are diminishing returns to conducting an 
increasing number of missions. If we extended the analysis to 100 conducted missions, the 
minimum required fratricide rate will remain relatively high at 21.0%. Thus, the statistical 
returns from conducting a large number of missions may not justify the incremental test 
costs. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The analysis performed in the previous sections is predicated on a number of 
assumptions. Among these assumptions are (1) the variability in performance measures 
across missions is identical for both the SUT unit and the baseline unit, (2) 90% confidence 
level is the more appropriate confidence level for the statistical analysis, and (3) the 
performance of the SUT unit in the LUT 09 is representative of its future performance in 
subsequent IOT&E. For the sensitivity analysis, we modified each of these assumptions and 
examined the corresponding response of the required unit mean performance limits for 
statistical significance.  
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One key assumption in the previous analysis was that the variability exhibited in 
several of the SUT performance measures may be used as a proxy for the variability of the 
baseline unit performance. We believed this assumption to be justifiable as this has been 
the case in many prior side-by-side tests. In order to test the robustness of our conclusions 
to changes in variability, we relaxed our assumption by assuming the performance variability 
of the baseline unit is half that of the SUT unit. 
Confidence levels are often used to establish bounds on performance metrics in the 
presence of uncertainty. While traditionally analysis is conducted at standard confidence 
levels (90%, 95%, or 99%), the criteria for selecting confidence levels are arbitrary. To 
understand the sensitivity of our previous analysis to the changes in confidence levels, we 
reduced the confidence interval to 80%. 
Finally, survey results in the LUT 09 indicated that the unit claimed the SUT was not 
instrumental in accomplishing missions. Based on this response, we reexamined the data 
assuming the values obtained in the LUT 09 represent the baseline unit instead of the SUT 
unit. Next, we evaluated how much improvement the new system must provide in order to 
be statistically different.  
Table 4 shows the results for the sensitivity analysis for the 13 conducted missions in 
LUT 09. The initial results are those obtained in the previous sections (i.e., initial results 
assumed the LUT 09 was representative of the SUT and described how well or poorly a 
baseline must perform to be different from the SUT). 
Table 4. Results of Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
Required Values for Statistical Significance in 
IOT&E 







Level = 80% SUT 
Missions Not Accomplished 1 4-6 N/A 4 -- 
Mission Success Rate 0.85 63.2% N/A 71.1% 98.2% 
BLUFOR Casualty Rate 10.1% 12.9% 12.1% 11.9% 4.7% 
OPFOR Casualty Rate 22.3% 13.7% 16.2% 16.7% 31.0% 
BLUFOR Fratricide Rate 14.6% 24.5% 21.6% 21.2% 7.3%  
For the mission success metrics (missions losses and success rate), only two of the 
three scenarios applied. Relaxing the confidence level to 80% saw the number of mission 
losses by the baseline unit fall by about one or two to four (for both cases in which XLW = 0  
or XLW = 1) or around 30.8% of all missions conducted. The mission success rate of the 
baseline unit increased to 71.1% from 63.2%. Interestingly, reducing the variability by 50% 
or the confidence level to 80% exhibited almost identical impacts on the casualty and 
fratricide rates. In both cases, the BLUFOR casualty rate declined to just over 11.5%, the 
OPFOR casualty rate rose to just over 16.0% and the BLUFOR fratricide rate fell to around 
21.0%.  
There are a number of insights that we can draw from the sensitivity analysis. First, it 
is unlikely that the comparative test at the IOT&E will lead to any statistically relevant 
conclusion regarding the BLUFOR fratricide rate. Under relaxed assumptions, the fratricide 
rate needed to show a statistical difference remained high, above what is currently observed 
in combat (Bower, Lacey, & McCarthy, 2003; Gadsden & Outteridge, 2006). Second, 
relaxing the variability by half and shifting the confidence interval from 90% to 80% provide 
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results that are more consistent with the hoped for operational performance of the baseline 
unit in the cases of the mission success and BLUFOR casualty measures. The OPFOR 
casualty measure remained significantly lower than that normally observed in actual combat. 
Judging from the new mission and BLUFOR casualty rates, one might infer that there may 
be some opportunity to produce statistically conclusive results for the mission success and 
BLUFOR casualty metrics 
The sensitivity analysis provided a potentially positive outlook for gaining conclusive 
information about the ability of the SUT to enhance situational awareness evident through 
reduced casualties and improved mission success. The potential outlook may support the 
argument for conducting a comparative test as planned. However, it is important to 
understand the disadvantage of relaxing these two assumptions. Operational tests are often 
complex with a great degree of variability in test parameters. While relaxing the assumptions 
produces plausible results, there is a lower degree of confidence associated with the derived 
conclusions. Rephrased in a more colloquial manner, increasing the likelihood of drawing 
conclusions reduces the confidence in those conclusions. 
Recall in the third set of sensitivity analyses, we assumed that data gathered from 
the  LUT 09 was representative of the baseline unit as opposed to the SUT unit. This was 
done as units noted that the SUT did not help in their missions. From the results of the 
sensitivity analysis, and if we assumed that the performance exhibited in LUT 09 formed a 
baseline, the mission success rate indicates that the SUT unit would effectively need to win 
all of their missions in order to produce statistically significant conclusions. However, a 
review of the metric and the number of mission losses by the SUT unit suggests that it is not 
possible to obtain statistically significant results even with a 100% mission success rate. The 
minimum required mean SUT BLUFOR casualty rate was extremely low at 4.7% and the 
maximum required SUT fratricide rate to yield statistical significance at 7.3%. These rates 
imply for a unit with a starting strength of 140, only approximately seven casualties and zero 
fratricides occur. 
The conflicting inferences drawn about the SUT unit needed improvement in regard 
to the mission success measures raised questions about whether it is possible to draw 
statistical conclusions given the current set-up of the side-by-side test. The required mean 
casualty and fratricide rates appear to be optimistic. At this point, we reserved any judgment 
about the possibility of the SUT unit achieving such rates. It is possible that there will be 
significant performance improvements in the SUT system during subsequent testing. 
Conclusion 
The objective of this analysis was to demonstrate the use of statistical inference to 
better understand the potential of an SUT in improving the operational performance of a 
given unit prior to conducting a comparative test. Specifically, we wanted to establish 
expectations for the statistical outcome of a comparative test by examining whether the 
behavior of the means and standard deviations of the metrics can reasonably be expected 
to generate differences. Initial results indicated that while the comparative test set-up for the 
SUT may yield statistically significant results for one of the system evaluation metrics, it is 
highly unlikely that evaluators will observe statistical significance in the remaining metrics.  
One factor often cited for the lack of observed statistical significance is large 
variability in performance metrics due to the complexity of operational tests. While there is 
some justification for this statement, there are other factors, which may be adjusted in the 
test structuring to yield a more informative test outcome. By dissecting the underlying 
factors, which drive each metric, we pointed to potential improvements for test structuring, 
which may enhance the likelihood of observing differences in a greater percentage of the 
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metrics. Most notably was a recommendation to reconsider the BLUFOR to OPFOR starting 
strength ratio. While this ratio may be representative of current field operations, it is 
somewhat inhibitive to understanding the potential benefits of the SUT to unit performance.  
Finally, the metrics presented in this analysis provide a glimpse into the top level 
performance of a unit with the SUT. However, it is important to note that the analysis did not 
consider qualitative measures of operational effectiveness. Information for qualitative 
assessments is gathered through surveys and structured interviews, and it may provide 
added insights not immediately evident in the quantitative metrics used. 
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